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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Douglas Richard Nay appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Nay contends the district court 
erred in (1) denying his request for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, 
(2) summarily dismissing his petition, and (3) denying his request for counsel on 
appeal. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court recited the underlying fact of Nay's criminal convictions 
as follows: 
In FE-2010-0009990, [Nay) was charged with Vehicular 
Manslaughter and felony Possession of a Controlled Substance. In 
FE-2010-12576, [Nay) was charged with two counts of delivery of 
methamphetamine. The cases were consolidated before [the 
district court]. [Nay) entered a guilty plea in the Manslaughter Case 
on October 6, 2010 and a guilty plea to one count of Delivery of a 
Controlled Substance in the Delivery case on October 12, 2010. 
On the Vehicular Manslaughter case, the plea bargain 
contemplated that the State would recommend a sentence of 
thirteen years with no fixed portion, with dismissal of the second 
count of methamphetamine possession. It was also agreed that he 
would plead guilty in FE 2010-12576 to one count of Delivery of a 
Controlled Substance, the remaining charge would be dismissed, 
and the State would recommend a sentence of fifteen years to life. 
In each case, it was agreed that [Nay] could ask for any lesser 
sentence he wished. In addition to being examined by the Court on 
his pleas on two separate dates, [Nay) executed a written Guilty 
Plea Advisory Form with respect to each separate case. The State 
did not pursue a persistent violator enhancement. [Nay) was 
sentenced to ten years fixed followed by five years indeterminate 
on the Vehicular Manslaughter conviction. He was sentenced to 
seven years fixed up to life or the Delivery of a Controlled 
Substance with the sentences for each case concurrent. 
Thereafter, [Nay] filed motions for sentence reduction which were 
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denied. The sentences were appealed and the [Court of Appeals] 
affirmed in 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 615. 
(R., p.38 (capitalization original).) 
On June 18, 2012, Nay filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways. Nay also filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel, which the district court denied. (R., pp.22-24, 27.) The 
state filed an answer, and the court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("Notice"). 
(R., pp.31-33, 37-45.) Nay filed a response to the court's Notice, after which the 
court entered an Order of Dismissal. (R., pp.51-54, 56-57.) 
Nay filed a timely notice of appeal from the Order of Dismissal and a 
request for counsel on appeal. 1 (R., pp.59-63, 72-74.) The district court denied 
Nay's request for appellate counsel. (R., p.77.) 
On appeal, the state filed a Motion for Remand and Statement in Support 
Thereof ("Motion"), requesting remand of this case "for consideration of Nay's 
motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel to determine whether his 
petition alleges the possibility of a valid claim (as opposed to whether it was 
subject to summary dismissal without an evidentiary hearing)." (Motion, p.6, filed 
December 11, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted the Motion and 
suspended the appeal. (Order Granting Motion for Remand to the District Court, 
dated January 15, 2014.) 
1 After Nay filed his Notice of Appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded this 
case for entry of final judgment. (R., p.78.) The district court entered a "Final 
Judgment" on June 6, 2013. (R., p.79.) 
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On February 26, 2014, the district court entered a Second Order Denying 
Appointment of Counsel ("Second Order")2 after which the Court, by email 
notification dated March 7, 2014, reset the due date for the Respondent's brief. 3 
2 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to augment the record 
with the district court's Second Order. 
3 The state assumes this notice also serves as an order reinstating this appeal. 
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ISSUES 
Nay states the issues on appeal as: 
1 ). Did the Petitioner present a "preponderance of evidence" in 
the District Court, which should have precluded dismissal of 
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
2). Did the District Court err when it denied the Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel during the Post Conviction 
Proceeding? 
3). Did the District Court err when it refused to appoint counsel 
for appellate purposes? 
4). Is the Appellant entitled to appeal the length of his sentence, 
and if so, is counsel obligated to file such an appeal? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.11.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to consider any "claim" that the district 
court erred in denying his request for post-conviction and appellate counsel since 
Nay has failed to support any such "claim" with argument and authority? 
Alternatively, has Nay failed to show the possibility of a valid claim that entitled 
him to the appointment of counsel? 
2. Because none of Nay's claims were possibly valid, has Nay 





Nay Has Waived Any Claim Related To The Appointment Of Counsel; 
Alternatively, He Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions For 
Appoint Of Post-Conviction And Appellate Counsel 
A Introduction 
In his statement of the issues, Nay complains the district court erred in 
denying his "otion for appoint of counsel during the post conviction proceeding" 
and "when it refused to appoint counsel for appellate purposes." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.11 (capitalization altered).) Because Nay does not support either of these 
claims with argument and authority, this Court should decline to consider them. 
Alternatively, Nay has failed to show error in the denial of either of his requests 
for counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether to grant or deny a post-conviction petitioner's request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the trial court. Eby v. State, 148 
Idaho 731,738,228 P.3d 998, 1005 (2010). 
C. Nay Has Waived Any Claim Related To The Appointment Of Counsel By 
Failing To Support It With Argument And Authority 
Nay's statement of the issues includes the district court's failure to appoint 
counsel to represent him in either the post-conviction proceedings or on appeal; 
however, he failed to support either of these claims with argument and authority. 
(See generally R., pp.1-10.) Although Nay cites authority in his brief, none of the 
authority he cites relates to the appointment of counsel either in post-conviction 
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or on appeal. With respect to argument to support his claims, Nay asserts he 
showed by a "preponderance of the Evidence" that he is "entitled to the relief 
sought, and therefore the Court erred when it failed to appoint Counsel to Assist 
[him]." (Appellant's Brief, p.5 (capitalization original).) These conclusory 
statements, unsupported by authority, should not be considered by this Court. 
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010) 
(citations omitted) ("Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error 
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. A general attack 
on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to 
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue."). 
D. Even If Considered, Nay Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His 
Requests For Counsel 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the 
UPCPA, a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who 
is unable to pay the costs of representation." Murphy v. State, 2014 WL 712695 
*3 (2014) (citing I.C. § 19-4904; Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 
P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004 )). "The standard for determining whether to appoint 
counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the 
petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Murphy at *3 (citing 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). "In deciding 
whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court 
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should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with 
adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further 
investigation into the claims." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 
15 (2007). A "petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to 
search the record for possible nonfrivolous claims." JJ:L Further, if the claims in 
the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they 
could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and 
further investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed 
with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 
P. 3d at 1111 . 
On remand, the district court denied Nay's request for counsel, stating: 
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On June 29, 2012, this Court denied counsel pending review 
of the case and advised that counsel would be appointed if the 
petition was not subject to summary dismissal. The record was 
reviewed and the petition was subject to summary dismissal. The 
Court had ordered the transcripts of the plea and sentencing 
hearings and considered the Guilty Plea Advisory forms. A review 
of all of the foregoing information and consideration of the petition 
itself led to the conclusion that there was not the possibility of a 
valid claim that any reasonable person would hire an attorney, at 
his or her own expense, to pursue. It is in the Court's discretion to 
decide if counsel should be appointed and it is the practice of this 
Court to appoint one as soon as a review of all key information 
indicates even the sliver of an issue. Because the review did not 
reveal even the possibility of a valid claim, no counsel was 
appointed. 
(Second Order, pp.1-2.) The court also noted it denied Nay's request for 
appellate counsel "because no meritorious issues were raised." (Second Order, 
p.2.) The district court correctly concluded Nay was not entitled to appointed 
counsel. 
Nay alleged six ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his petition. 
Specifically, Nay alleged counsel was ineffective (1) "when he failed to suppress 
non-Mirandized statements to the police," (2) "by not correcting mis-information 
in the P.S.I.," (3) "by convincing and inducing [Nay's] reliance on assertions of a 
sentence of 5+10 at most," (4) "encouraging [Nay] to plead guilty in the place of 
preparing a defense," (5) "by failing to file a Rule 35 on both convictions," and (6) 
"by failing to file an appeal upon denial of [the] Rule 35." (R., pp.6-7.) The court 
indicated it reviewed the "transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings and 
considered the Guilty Plea Advisory forms" to determine whether Nay's petition 
alleged a possibly valid claim and concluded it did not. A review of those items 
supports the district court's conclusion. 
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During his guilty plea colloquy to the vehicular manslaughter charge, the 
court asked Nay if he made "any kind of confession or admission to the police in 
this case" and Nay responded, "No ma'am." (#38322 Tr.4, p.13, Ls.14-16.) 
Although Nay claims in his supporting affidavit that the police "questioned" him in 
the hospital "while [he was] fading in and out of consciousness" and did so 
without providing Miranda warnings, he does not identify what incriminating 
statements were made. However, shortly after the court asked Nay during his 
plea colloquy if he made "any kind of confession or admission," and he denied as 
much, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor, the court, and 
defense counsel: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Going back to the question Your Honor 
asked about whether he made a confession to the police, there was 
an interview with the police. I don't know if you would characterize 
it as a confession, necessarily, but that's something Your Honor 
maybe should know, in all candor. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I have discussed this with Mr. 
Nay, and he did conduct an interview with the police. He did not 
given any information that ultimately, I think, led to his immediate 
conviction. 
And we went over whether or not a suppression motion 
would be in order, and we made the determination that a 
4 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to take judicial notice 
of the transcript from Docket No. 38322 and the Guilty Plea Advisory Forms from 
Nay's underlying criminal cases, all of which the district court considered in 
relation to Nay's post-conviction petition. For the Court's convenience, the Guilty 
Plea Advisory Forms are attached hereto as Appendices A and B. 
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suppression motion was not going to be necessary.[5] 
THE COURT: Well, of course, that's addressed on page 5 
of the guilty plea examination form in Questions 22 and 23 
specifically. 
(#38322 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-21.) 
Question 22 of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form asks whether there "any 
motions or other requests for relief' Nay "believe[s] should still be filed in this 
case." (Appendix A, p.6.) Nay circled "No." (Id.) Question 23 asks whether Nay 
understood that if he entered an unconditional plea he would be unable to 
"challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea" including "any issues 
about any statements [he] may have made to law enforcement." (Id.) Nay 
circled "Yes." (Id.) Nay did not disagree with either his counsel's representations 
regarding the suppression issue or the validity of his responses on the Advisory 
Form. To the contrary, he advised the court during his plea colloquy that counsel 
had not failed to do anything Nay wanted him to do, which presumably includes 
5 During his factual basis, the prosecutor later indicated that when Nay "talked to 
the officer in the hospital a few days after" the accident, he first denied using 
methamphetamine or amphetamine but when the officer told Nay they had Nay's 
urine, Nay said, "Well, it's going to be hot for methamphetamine" and "admitted 
that he had used into the day before -- two days before." (#38322 Tr., p.24, 
Ls.12-20.) Presumably counsel's decision to forego the suppression motion and 
take advantage of the plea offer was based on a conclusion that, even if Nay 
obtained a favorable suppression ruling, he would still be convicted based on the 
blood test results. This is a well-recognized strategic and tactical decision. See 
Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011) (holding that state post-conviction court's 
conclusion that counsel was not deficient in advising defendant to enter "a quick 
no-contest plea" without first filing a motion to suppress defendant's confession 
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Even ... 
one of Weaver's expert witnesses, agreed with the State's suggestion that an 
attorney would not file a motion to suppress if it were in the client's best interests 
to negotiate the most favorable plea bargain possible."). 
10 
the suppression motion they discussed, and that he understood the Advisory 
Form and voluntarily and truthfully answered all questions included in that form. 
(#38322 Tr., p.16, L.25- p.17, L.2, p.18, Ls.7-25.) 
Also notable is that in responding the court's Notice in relation to this 
claim, where the court noted Nay "did not explain which statements made to 
police he wanted suppressed" (R., p.43), he did not expound on the allegation 
but merely repeated "it is the statements given at the hospital" (R., p.52). Nor did 
he explain why counsel's decision not to file a suppression motion, made in 
consultation with Nay, constituted ineffective assistance. Under the 
circumstances, the district court correctly concluded Nay failed to raise a possibly 
valid claim regarding counsel's failure to file a suppression motion. See McKay 
v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) ("If the record 
conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim, summary 
dismissal is appropriate.").6 
There is no possibility that Nay's second and third claims are valid either 
because they, too, are disproved by the record. Regarding the presentence 
report, which Nay alleged contained letters written by the victim's parents that 
contained "false information" to which counsel should have objected, this issue 
was addressed at the outset of the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor advised 
the court: 
6 Although this legal principle is stated in the context of summary dismissal as 
opposed to whether there is a possibility of a valid claim for purposes of 
appointing counsel, the state submits that it applies equally to the latter since 
claims disproved by the record cannot possibly be valid. 
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Judge, there is one discrepancy I would like to point out, and 
that is with regards to this latest addendum to the presentence 
investigation for the letter, it's a two-page single-spaced letter, in 
the form, basically, of an e-mail from Ms. Valerie Spencer directed 
to Your Honor dated the 18th of November. 
In the last paragraph, Judge, she references a meeting that 
we had in which she claims that I told her that the defendant had 
wrote a letter saying that, quote, "Tom had deserved to die, and 
that it was Tom's fault that he died," and she felt like she had been 
kicked in the stomach. 
I have reviewed that -- that struck me as inaccurate. And, in 
fact, I believe ... it is inaccurate, and I talked to the victim witness 
coordinator to make sure that that was also her point of view on it, 
and she agreed . 
. . . And so, Judge, I think what she's referring to is what's 
included in the presentence investigation report. I don't -- this is --
the page isn't numbered, but there is a typed -- a handwritten letter 
from the defendant to his girlfriend ... in which the defendant talks 
about how that the victim took his life into his own hands because 
his seat wasn't bolted, et cetera, and those were things that we 
shared as far as telling them what we think that the defensive 
strategy was going to be in the case. 
It wasn't a matter of us telling the victim -- and I can't control 
too much. I didn't realize there was a miscommunication going on 
there. We never said that he deserved to die, or anything like 
that[.] 
(#38322 Tr., p.39, L.12 - p.41, L.2.) 
Trial counsel subsequently addressed the issue stating, "And we were 
also troubled by that. We thank the State for the correction and the clarification 
on that. There was certainly no intent on Mr. Nay's part to at all besmirch the 
name of the victim of this crime." (#38322 Tr., p.41, L.23 - p.42, L.2.) Trial 
counsel also reiterated during his sentencing recommendation that Nay was 
remorseful and aware that "[i]t [was] because of his negligence that Tom Spencer 
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is no longer with us, and he feels that every day[.]" (#38322 Tr., p.50, Ls.4-15.) 
Nay himself also expressed his remorse and acknowledged his actions resulted 
in the victim's death. (#38322 Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.1.) The record, therefore, 
disproves any validity to Nay's second claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the letter in the PSI. 
Nay's third claim is that counsel "convinc[ed] and induc[ed] [his] reliance 
on assertions of a sentence of 5+10 at most." (R., p.6.) However, even 
assuming defense counsel predicted that Nay would receive a "sentence of 5+10 
at most," the plea agreement itself put Nay on notice of the potential sentences 
that could be imposed and the district court disabused Nay of any such belief 
before he pied guilty. In the vehicular manslaughter case, the state agreed to 
recommend 13 years fixed. (#38322 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-23; Appendix A, p.4.) In the 
delivery case, the state agreed to recommend "15 to life." (#38322 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-
8; Appendix A, p.4.) The court, during Nay's plea colloquy, advised him the "plea 
bargain agreement is simply a recommendation" that was "not binding on the 
court." (#38322 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-22.) Nay acknowledged he was "aware of that." 
(#38322 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-25.) Nay also specifically acknowledged the non-
binding nature of the plea agreement in the Guilty Plea Advisory Forms by 
initialing the following statement: 
I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea 
agreement. This means that the judge is not bound by the 
agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose 
any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for 
any offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if 
the district chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not have the 
right to withdraw my guilty plea. 
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(Appendix A, p.4; Appendix B., p.4.) Nay also stated, under oath, that nobody 
promised him leniency as a result of his plea nor offered him any "reward or 
incentive to plead guilty." (#38322 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-14, 19-21.) 
Although the plea agreement allowed the defense to request a lesser 
sentence than that being recommended by the state, and that authorized by law, 
and trial counsel may have been hopeful that the court would grant his request 
for retained jurisdiction with an underlying sentence of 15 years, with five years 
fixed (#38322 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-11), this does not mean counsel was ineffective in 
making a prediction about the likelihood of any particular sentence. See, ~. 
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009) (a 
petitioner cannot show ineffective assistance where court advised him of the 
consequences of his guilty plea and even "a good faith assurance of leniency or 
a mere prediction by a defense counsel to a defendant of the sentence 
anticipated is no grounds for post conviction relief although the sentence 
imposed is greater than predicted"). Accordingly, there is no possible validity to 
Nay's third claim. 
Nay's fourth claim also suffers from lack of validity when considered in 
light of his statements during his underlying criminal cases. Rather than 
supporting his assertion that counsel "encourag[ed]" him to "plead guilty in the 
place of preparing a defense," the record shows Nay wanted to plead guilty and 
Nay has failed to identify any valid defense. (R., p.11.) According to his affidavit, 
Nay wanted counsel to pursue a potential defense that involved "get[ting] tox-
counts on the blood and urine" and "seek[ing] out a specialist." (R., p.11.) 
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According to Nay, counsel said "he talked to one, but thought [Nay] would be 
better off not wasting [his] time on it." (R., p.11.) Nay complained he "believe[d] 
counsel was merely passifying [sic] [him]." (R., p.11.) This is not a possibly valid 
claim for several reasons. First, there is no basis for concluding that counsel did 
not do precisely what he told Nay he did - consulted a specialist on the issue. 
Second, there is no basis for concluding that the test results actually obtained 
were invalid or otherwise subject to impeachment. Third, when pleading guilty to 
vehicular manslaughter, to which this allegation presumably relates, Nay said he 
had "been wanting to plead guilty for quite a while," was satisfied with his 
lawyer's actions, denied he wanted counsel to talk to any additional witnesses, 
and that he was pleading guilty free and voluntarily. (#38322 Tr., p.16, L.7 -
p.17, L.5, p.18, Ls.7-25, p.22, Ls.15-17.) His Guilty Plea Advisory Form reflected 
many of these same sentiments. (Appendix A, pp.4-5.) In light of the foregoing, 
Nay's fourth claim is not possibly valid. 
In his fifth claim, Nay contends counsel was ineffective for "failing to file a 
Rule 35 on both convictions." (R., p.6.) Nay is correct in his assertion that 
counsel did not file a Rule 35 motion in his vehicular manslaughter case. 
Counsel did, however, file a Rule 35 motion in his delivery case. 7 (Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence, filed March 17, 2011 (augmentation).) The brief 
filed in support of that motion explains why such a motion was not filed: 
"Defendant is not requesting a reduction in the Court's sentence imposed in CR-
7 The state's motion to augment also includes a request to augment the record 
with the Rule 35 pleadings filed in relation to CR-FE-2010-0012576, which were 
augmented to the record in Nay's direct appeal. 
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FE-2010-009990 [the manslaughter case] as it was just for him to receive said 
sentence." (Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Sentence, filed March 17, 2011 (augmentation).) Indeed, it was the very 
underlying sentence counsel requested on that charge; not to mention the 
sentence Nay identifies in his post-conviction petition as the sentence counsel 
allegedly told him he would receive. (R., p.11.) It was hardly deficient for 
counsel not to ask for a reduction when the court imposed the sentence he 
requested. Nor is there any possible validity to an assertion that Nay was 
prejudiced as a result of counsel's failure to do so. This is especially true where, 
as here, the sentence on which counsel sought Rule 35 relief was far greater (life 
with seven years fixed) than the sentence for which he did not seek relief (15 
years with five fixed). Claim five is not possibly valid. 
Finally, Nay's sixth claim is also not possibly valid. In claim six, Nay 
contends counsel failed to appeal the "denial of [the] Rule 35." (R., p.6.) 
Although there was no separate notice of appeal filed after the court denied 
Nay's Rule 35 motion, appellate counsel augmented the record on appeal with 
the Rule 35 pleadings. That information was available for consideration by the 
appellate court and the Court referenced the Rule 35 in its opinion. State v. Nay, 
Docket Nos. 38322 & 38323, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 615 (Sept. 14, 2011 
Ct. App). Claim six is not possibly valid. 
Given that Nay failed to raise the possibility of any valid claim, Nay cannot 
show error in the district court's decision to deny his request for post-conviction 
counsel, much less is subsequent request for appellate counsel. 
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II. 
Nay Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Nay argues the court erred in dismissing his petition because, he asserts, 
he "in fact met the necessary 'preponderance of evidence' standard." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This is not the relevant legal standard for summary 
dismissal; nevertheless, Nay failed to meet the applicable standard and has 
therefore failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803 (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Nay Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
17 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. !fl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." ~ 
Because Nay failed to satisfy the lesser standard of showing a possibly 
valid claim, he has necessarily failed to meet the higher standard of showing a 
genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to avoid summary dismissal. 
Thus, for the reasons articulated in Section I, supra, Nay has failed to show error 
in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's orders 
denying Nay's requests for counsel and summarily dismissing Nay's petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2014. 
ICA M. LORELLO 
Dep ty Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of April, 2014, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DOUGLAS NAY, #56217 
I.S.C.I. 
P.O. BOX 14 
BOISE, ID 83707 
/ 
M. LORELLO 
Deputy torney General 
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Guilty Plea Advisory Form for use in Judge Bail's ocr 6 ·-- 2010 
Court 8;·_~A~~~ 
Defendant's Name: D0,~u.S .Q, t':?--bl DliPVTv , 
Date: I O I € J 1 0 • 
Case Number: c.R- EE-- lo - ooocff}O 
Sentence range on charges for which a guilty plea is being entered: 
\)e\\; c . !'f\c.N;.~inimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: \5 )f f g/\, 
_______ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: ___ _ 
_______ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:. ___ _ 
____ ..,__ __ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: ____ _ 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA 
OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE L'VITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything 
about the crime( s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a 
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. 
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. en/ 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the, crime( s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under 
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after 
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any 
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) 
to which you are pleading guilty. If you do waive your rights under Estrada, 
you do not have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any 
information that might tend to show you committed some other 
crime(s) . .!Jd_ 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect 
to answering questions or providing information that may increase my 
sentence unless I waive my rights under Estrada, in which case, I understand 
that I must talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with 
Judge Bail's guilty pica form rcv'd 5/18/l0 
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any evaluators regardless of whether it may tend to incriminate me in some 
other crime(s).w 
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an 
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who 
will be paid by the county. Or-( 
4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: I) you 
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed 
innocent.t:t:l 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a 
proceeding to determine whether you are guilty of the charge(s) brought 
against you. You are presumed to be innocent of having committed any 
crime until and unless the State proves you are guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In a jury trial, all evidence is submitted to members of this 
community who serve as jurors. You and your attorney will have a role in 
choosing the people who sit on your jury. In a jury trial, you have the right 
to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense if you 
want to although the decision to testify is entirely up to you. No one can 
force you to testify at your trial. The State must convince each and every 
one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand thattPeading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and 
public jury trial. 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This means that 
the witnesses who testify against you in your jury trial will be placed under 
oath and will testify in your presence and be subject to questioning by your 
attorney. You also have the right to call witnesses of your choosing to 
testify on your behalf. You have the right to compel the attendance of 
witnesses who will testify for you and, if you cannot afford to bring those 
witnesses to court, they will be paid for at public expense. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront and 
cross examine the witnesses against me, and to present witnesses and 
evidence in my defense.12::y' 
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QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question 
consult your attorney before answerin2,) 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
1. Do you read and write the English language?~NO 
If not, have you been provided wJth. an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? YES'NO 
2. What is your age?,sD 
3. What is yt,ur true legal 
name? D n"'-~ \ ,__s. Le c f!A/20 {'-__( A'-/ 
4. How far did you go in school? I 'L 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
either a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma?~NO 
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental 
health professional? YES(@ 
6. Have you: ever been diagnosed with a mental 
health disorder?~ NO 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? 
f\ C') +:I Q, Ot-..Nf) DtrPLe$ (c)4 ( '26o3' 
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES~ 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? YES(@) 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications 
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages 
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned 
and informed decision in this case? YE@=) 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable 
to make a~ed and informed decision in this 
case?YE~ 
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=c.:..:..R_--"-=E...;.-...-::o:..:.l-"'-.......,~'"-'-'~-'=l.o'--"""'...,,-1'-+_.;u...,..._L....IQUJU-+~...._-=--"-....:..;..;...,._____,_..a.:..:,y_,=
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11. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. 
This means that the judge is not bound by the agreement or any 
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized 
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court 
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow 
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.o.!{ 
12. As a term of your plea agreemen~e you pleading 
guilty to more than one crime? YESW 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
( at the same time) or consecutively ( one after 
the other)@ NO 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? YES@ 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment 
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? YES :@ 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which 
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YE~ 
If so, .what are those promises? 
16.Do you feel you have had ~ient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney?@§ NO 
17. Have you to!~r attorney everything you know 
about the crime·.~ NO 
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18. Is there anything you have requ~ your attorney 
to do that has not been done? YES@,} 
If yes, please 
explain. -------------------------
I 9. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor 
relating to your case. This may include police 
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs, 
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called 
discovery. Have you reviewed ~~nee provided to 
your attorney during discovery'!~NO 
20.Have you told your attorney about any witnesses 
who would show your innocence? YES@) I .Affl G:L-t<'---c-y 
2 I. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you 
will waive any defenses, both factual a~al, that 
you believe you may have in this case? NO 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief 
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YES~ 
If so, what motions or 
requests? ________________________ _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to 
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea 
including: 1) any searches or seizures that occurred in 
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or 
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any 
statements you may have made to law enforcement'@No 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, 
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation 
contained in the charge(s) to which you plead 
guilty@NO ~ 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole@NO 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this 
case could be the basis of a violation of that probation 
or parole?~ NO 
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the 
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual 
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admissions could have consequences of deportation 
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the 
United States, or ~ of an application for United 
States citizenship?~ NO 
27.Are you required by the crime to which you will 
plead guilty to register as a sex offender? (LC. § 18-8304) YES~ 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case? 
(LC. § 19-5304)@ NO 
29.Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other 
party as a condition of your plea agreement? YE@:) 
If so, to whom? --------------
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension 
as a result of a guilty plea in this case? YES NO 
If so, for how long must your license 
be suspended? ______________ _ 
31. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a 
mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or 
psychosexual evaluation is requi~ (LC. §§ 18-
918(7)( a),-8005(9),-8317) YE~ 
32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
may be required to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) YES@ 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
will be required to S':_~ a DNA sample to the state? 
(I.C. § 19-5506) YE~ 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the 
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up 
to $5,000, pay~b to the victim of the crime? (I.C. § 
19-5307) YE 0 
35. Do you un erstand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose your right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 
3)~NO 
367Yc(you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose your right to h~ublic office in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3~ NO 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
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lose your right to perf9r!n jury service in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3~NO 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony you will lose your righ!..~-I2¥,~c11ase, possess, or 
carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310~0 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your~_ 
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case?~NO 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily?@S NO 
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit 
the acts alleged in the information or indictment?@s>NO 
42. lfyou were provided with an interpreter to help 
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding 
your interpreter? YES NO 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the 
questions in this form which you could not resolve by 
discussing the issue with your attorney? YES'@) 
I have answered the guestions on each page of this Guilty Plea 
Advisory form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and 
answers in this form, and I have discussed each question and 
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely 
and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do 
filh 
Dated this day of ;a /0 , 20 l b . 
ve discussed, in detail, the 
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APPENDIX B 
Guilty Plea Advisory Form for use in Judge Bail's OCT l 2 2010 
Court f J. oAv@~. crerJ 
Defendant's Name: D~eS ~, Nc-.y ev -- DEPUTY :-
Date: C)Z.---F[; - 2'.p\o.,.. oo I Z 516 
Case Number: ---------------------Sentence range on charges for which a guilty plea is being entered: 
~li'lleC'( ~~Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:~lrt:-e.,__, __ 
_______ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: ___ _ 
_______ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: ___ _ 
----~ __ Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: ___ _ 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA 
OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything 
about the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a 
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. 
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial.W 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the· crime( s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under 
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after 
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any 
question or to provide any infonnation that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime( s) 
to which you are pleading guilty. If you do waive your rights under Estrada, 
you do not have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any 
information that might tend to show you committed some other 
crime(s).'Cd_ 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect 
to answering questions or providing information that may increase my 
sentence unless I waive my rights under Estrada, in which case, I understand 
that I must talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with 
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any evaluators regardless of whether it may tend to incriminate me in some 
other crime(s).oc_ 
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an 
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who 
will be paid by the county.~ 
4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you 
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed 
innocent&Af 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a 
proceeding to determine whether you are guilty of the charge( s) brought 
against you. You are presumed to be innocent of having committed any 
crime until and unless the State proves you are guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In a jury trial, all evidence is submitted to members of this 
community who serve as jurors. You and your attorney will have a role in 
choosing the people who sit on your jury. In a jury trial, you have the right 
to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense if you 
want to although the decision to testify is entirely up to you. No one can 
force you to testify at your trial. The State must convince each and every 
one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand th@, by leading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and 
public jury trial 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This means that 
the witnesses who testify against you in your jury trial will be placed under 
oath and will testify in your presence and be subject to questioning by your 
attorney. You also have the right to call witnesses of your choosing to 
testify on your behalf. You have the right to compel the attendance of 
witnesses who will testify for you and, if you cannot afford to bring those 
witnesses to court, they will be paid for at public expense. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront and 
cross examine the witnesses against me, and to present witnesses and 
evidence in my defense.0/\../ 
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QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(PJease answer every question. If you do not understand a question 
consult your attorney before answering.) 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
1. Do you read and write the English language? tgg NO 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? YES NO 
2. What is your age? h.Q 
3. What is your true legal 
name? [)01:1, c,½AS-. 6 {&J 
4. How far did you go in school?_,('---'( __ 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
either a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma?<YES>NO 
5. Are you currently under ~are of a mental 
health professional? YES~ 
6. Have you: ever~ diagnosed with a mental 
health disorder~O 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? 
A-w¼,L T Ao f:{ ~ f Dcrl-fi~-/S r0,.A- ( 
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES@ 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? YES NO 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications 
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages 
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned 
and informed decision in this case? YE~ 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable 
to make a ~oned and informed decision in this 
case?YESNO 
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10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? YES NO 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? 
fl £1e,se, :iJJ?... p\e4. ~trv\ ·,"' cg- Fe ..-1 o-919'0 
11. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. 
This means that the judge is not bound by the agreement or any 
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized 
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court 
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow 
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.DrJ 
12. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading 
guilty to more than one crime'!(yES NO 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the sa~e) or consecutively (one after 
the other)'~JNO 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? YE@ 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment 
of conviction an~tence as part of your plea 
agreement? YE~ 
15. Have any other promises been made to you whi~ 
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YES~ 
If so, .what are those promises? 
16.Do you feel you have ha~cient time to discuss 
your case with your attomey'(y:Es NO 
17. Have you tol~r attorney everything you know 
about the crime?~NO 
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18. Is there anything you have requ~ your attorney 
to do that has not been done? YESr~ 
If yes, please 
explain. _______________________ _ 
I 9. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor 
relating to your case. This may include police 
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs, 
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called 
discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence provided to 
your attorney during discoverym'S NO 
20.Have you told your attorne/aoo;:;t an~)nesses 
who would show your innocence? YES'~ 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you 
will waive any defenses, both factual an~~' that 
you believe you may have in this case?-~O 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief 
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YEs"w> 
If so, what motions or 
requests? _______________________ _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to 
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea 
including: 1) any searches or seizures that occurred in 
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or 
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any 
statements you may have made to law enforcement@No 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, 
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation 
containeJ4.t! the charge(s) to which you plead 
guilty?~NO 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole?@ NO 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this 
case coul~he basis of a violation of that probation 
or parole~ NO 
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the 
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual 
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admissions could have consequences of deportation 
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the 
United States, or d~ of an application for United 
States citizenshi~ NO 
27.Are you required by the crime to which you will 
plead guilty to register as a sex offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) YE,$@ 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay ~tion to the victims in this case? 
(LC. §19-5304)~ NO 
29.Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other 
party as a condition of your plea agreement?~O 
If so, to whom?_S_..;_-:1"__,,_'J:',.:_--=-......,._--'\ E=--------
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license su~ion 
as a result of a guilty plea in this case? YEs...N()) 
If so, for how long must your license 
be suspended? ______________ _ 
3 1. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a 
mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or 
psychosexual evaluation is reguired? (I.C. §§ 18-
9 I 8(7)(a),-8005(9),-83 I 7@ NO 
3 2. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
may be required to pay the costs of p~cution and 
investigation? (J.C. § 37-2732A(K))<.Y:ES NO 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you 
will be required to su~ DNA sample to the state? 
(I.C. § 19-5506) YE$._N0' 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the 
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence ofup 
to $5,000, pay~o the victim of the crime? (LC. § 
19-5307) YE~ 
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
l~ur right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 
3)~NO 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lose your right to hoJ4.Rublic office in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3)lYE$ NO 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
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lose your right to peifQrm jury service in Idaho? (ID. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3){yf.s'NO 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony you will lose your righ~~c?ase, possess, or 
carry firearms? (LC.§ 18-310~0 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your 
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case? ~O 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntaril~ NO 
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did com~ 
the acts al1eged in the information or indictmen~NO 
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help 
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding 
your interpreter? YES NO 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the 
questions in this form which you could not re~ by 
discussing the issue with your attorney? YE$li{Y 
I have answered the questions on each pa2e of this Guilty Plea 
Advisory form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and 
answers in this form, and I have discussed each question and 
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely 
and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do 
fil!: LDftz_ 
Dated this day of ~, 20 /C) . 
D~ 
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